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Abstract—Business Intelligence (BI) has gained a new lease of 
life through Cloud computing as its demand for unlimited 
hardware and platform resources expandability is fulfilled by the 
Cloud elasticity features. BI can be seamlessly deployed on the 
Cloud given that its multilayered model coincides with the Cloud 
multilayer models. It is considered by many Cloud service 
providers as one of the prominent applications services on public, 
outsourced private and outsourced community Clouds. However, 
in the shared domains of Cloud computing, BI is exposed to 
security and privacy threats by virtue of exploits, eavesdropping, 
distributed attacks, malware attacks, and such other known 
challenges on Cloud computing. Given the multi-layered model 
of BI and Cloud computing, its protection on Cloud computing 
needs to be ensured through multilayered controls. In this paper, 
a multi-layered security and privacy model of BI as a service on 
Cloud computing is proposed through an algorithm for ensuring 
multi-level session inspections, and ensuring maximum security 
controls at all the seven layers, and prevent an attack from 
occurring. This will not only reduce the risk of security breaches, 
but allow an organisation time to detect, and respond to an 
attack. The simulations present the effects of distributed attacks 
on the BI systems by attackers posing as genuine Cloud tenants. 
The results reflect how the attackers are blocked by the 
multilayered security and privacy controls deployed for 
protecting the BI servers and databases. 
Keywords-component; Business intelligence, Cloud computing, 
Security and privacy,  BI as a service, Cloud tenants vaults, 
Cloud tenants metadata. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Business intelligence (BI) with big data analysis has 
emerged as the key future technologies to be hosted on 
Cloud computing [1]. As per the reports by IBM Tech 
Trends 2011 and McKinsey Global Institute, these 
technologies on Clouds are the most sought by business 
organizations and industries for key emerging business 
applications like big data analytics, textual analytics, web 
analytics, network analytics, and mobile data analytics 
[2][3]. The emerging business areas needing BI with big data 
are E-commerce, market intelligence, E-government, E-
politics, science & technology, E-healthcare, public safety, 
and public security [2][3][4].  
New capabilities of Cloud computing are emerging 
amidst new expectations and new threats especially because 
of multi-tenancy environments and emerging security issues 
in virtualization environment and hypervisor vulnerabilities 
[5]. BI on Cloud is implemented employing XML data files 
with DTD (document type definition) structures [6]. The 
DTD format behaves like a relational database on the Cloud 
with characteristics similar to OLAP cubes [6]. This format, 
in a hierarchical data structure, can support heavy OLAP 
queries and its lightweight architecture can enable it to 
support big data on the Cloud with faceted search features 
[7]. BI with OLAP on Cloud can be configured by 
converting traditional data warehouse tables into XML data 
files, interlinking the data files using hierarchical DTD 
structures, defining all data files with the help of suitable 
structured metadata, and hosting the data files on distributed 
servers configured to generate a massive parallel processing 
environment when multi-tenant query loads are applied 
[6][7]. The computational power of Cloud can be assigned 
selectively to the OLAP queries through Cloud elasticity 
(like, Amazon Elastic Compute 2) and the service-oriented 
platforms (like, Amazon Web Services and Google App 
Engine) can be used for organizing the XML data files, their 
DTD structures, and the metadata repositories [8]. The 
reporting and visualization services may be delivered 
through dashboard services in BI applications delivered 
through service-oriented SaaS [8]. The architecture is multi-
layered with BI applications, decision support tools, access 
enablers, data management, data storage, and data sources 
forming separate layers on the Cloud within the framework 
of ETL (Extract, Transformation, and Loading) [9]. The 
Cloud layers can be suitably mapped with the BI layers 
within the ETL framework [8][9]. The BI data warehouses 
on the Cloud may be formed by XML data files extracts 
from traditional self-hosted business transactions databases 
that could enable planning, forecasting, budgeting, and 
business control functions through web-enabled and mobile-
enabled interfaces [10]. The key business uses could be 
relational documents access, rich multimedia reports, 
collaborative information, linking internal and external 
reports, and data on a click (low-latency data access [10].  
BI on the Cloud requires multi-layered security for 
ensuring appropriate protection of each BI layer [11]. The 
key security layers for BI on the Cloud are lightweight 
directory access protocol (LDAP), intrusion detection and 
prevention (IDPS), Antispam, web services security, 
antimalware, and database activity monitoring [11]. The key 
security services for BI on Cloud are identification, 
authentication, authorization, auditing, data confidentiality, 
data integrity, data availability, and prevention from 
unauthorized DB querying and transactions [12]. This 
research presents a multi-layer service-oriented security and 
privacy framework for BI in the Cloud with tenants’ session 
inspection occurring at each layer such that a decision for 
permitting or denying the session could be made. This 
architecture is suitable for outsourced private and community 
Cloud models [13]. The multi-layer Cloud modeling and the 
models representing public Cloud, outsourced private Cloud, 
and outsourced community Cloud are reviewed, and the 
proposed a multi-layered modeling approach through an 
algorithm solution for ensuring maximum security controls 
at all the seven layers are presented in the next section. 
II. CLOUD MODELS FOR THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Clouds can be modeled in the form of a seven-layer 
framework, comprising layer 1 as the physical infrastructure 
components layer, layer 2 as the virtualization resources 
abstraction layer, layer 3 as virtual resources composition 
layer, layer 4 as the IaaS, layer 5 as the PaaS, layer 6 as the 
SaaS providers’ applications layer, and layer 7 as the tenants’ 
applications layer [14]. NIST recommended multiple Cloud 
deployment models incorporating the Cloud layers in the 
form of five deployment scenarios – public Cloud, onsite 
private Cloud, outsourced private Cloud, onsite community 
Cloud, and outsourced community Cloud [13]. The proposed 
multi-layer service-oriented framework for securing BI on 
the Cloud is proposed for outsourced private and community 
Clouds. In the outsourced private Cloud model, multiple 
corporate owning BI applications, data marts, and data 
warehouses can host their resources on a Cloud service 
provider committed to serve organizational clients only [13]. 
In this model, each corporate client could be provided 
secured VPN access to the respective BI resources [13]. The 
outsourced community Cloud model will also have multi-
organization BI implementations, with a difference that the 
organizations can access each other’s resources by virtue of 
community-based agreements [13]. The proposed 
architecture comprises multi-layered security and privacy 
services offered at a cost, which may be unaffordable to 
retail Cloud clients. Hence, public Clouds have been kept 
outside this solution. In an outsourcing environment, each 
proposed layer is a Cloud in itself offering the specific 
security or privacy control in a service-oriented framework. 
For example, the anti-malware layer offers an array of Cloud 
databases comprising records of signatures and traces of 
malware entering through compromised sessions (i.e., 
embedded in the session packets).  
Before getting into the solution, a review of security and 
privacy as a service on Cloud computing is presented in the 
next section. 
III. SECURITY AND PRIVACY AS A SERVICE 
The security as a service is a multi-layer framework in 
which, appropriate security and privacy controls are 
positioned on each layer of the seven-layer model of Cloud 
computing [15]. In this model, every security layer mapped 
with the Cloud layer may be offered as a chargeable service 
to the clients [16]. Such a framework may be deployed as per 
the principles of trustworthy computing at each layer [16]. 
Given that IaaS access layer is made of virtual machines, all 
the security services will be accessible through VMs 
allocated to the tenant organizations [17]. The virtualization 
security manager may be embedded within the virtual 
machines manager that controls application profile allocation 
to end clients [17].  
The security and privacy controls need to be defined at 
the service interfaces between the tenants and the Cloud [18]. 
Hence, the key controls need to be positioned at the service 
virtualization abstraction layer [18]. For privacy controls, 
each tenant may be assigned a vault comprising privacy 
resources like digitally signed documents, encryption keys, 
tokens, and digital signatures [19][20]. This layer may be 
added over an authentication layer and a tenants’ metadata 
layer defining all attributes of the authorized tenants required 
for accessing appropriate resources on the Cloud 
[21][22][23]. A session can be denied by either of these 
layers if the tenant-specific information in the session 
packets does not match the database contents serving these 
layers. This concept is presented in the form of a detailed 
multi-layer design in the next section. 
IV. THE MULTI-LAYER SECURITY MODEL 
The model (Figure 1) is multi-layered Cloud architecture 
with each layer delivers one of the security/privacy services. 
The tenant sessions are allowed to pass through an array of 
firewalls acting as gateways. The firewalls are made of Cisco 
PIX 535 models acting as network, transport, and application 
layer firewalls. The firewalls can be equipped with access 
control lists based on protocols, IP addresses, hostnames, 
TCP/UDP ports for common applications and services, and 
higher order TCP/UDP ports for custom applications and 
services. At the application layer, the firewall comprises 
filters for allowing URLs, HTTPS sessions, FTP sessions, 
Java clients, and Active X controls, selectively.  In addition, 
the firewalls can encrypt all sessions using IKE 
(Internetwork Key Exchange) with IPSec (IP Security) 
protocol. The encryption services supported are DES (56 
bits), 3DES (128 bits), and AES (256 bits). 
The tenants are hosted on four tenant LANs accessing the 
Cloud network through four firewalls. In addition to the 
tenant LANs, three hackers are shown accessing the Cloud 
through different firewalls for simulating a distributed attack. 
The hackers have been modeled as clients gaining network 
and transport level access to the Cloud by breaking the 
firewalls. They can also be viewed as valid tenants that have 
gained access to the Cloud by buying a published 
subscription. 
 
Fig. 1. The model architecture 
The Cloud is made of seven layers as shown in Figure 
2. Each layer may be viewed as a Cloud in itself. The 
services of the layers are delivered by arrays of servers 
deployed in them to ensure that there is no performance 
bottleneck. The tenant sessions enter the Cloud through the 
firewalls and pass through the layers in a sequential manner. 
Each layer verifies the sessions and allows further 
communications with the next layer above it [24]. After a 
series of examinations, the sessions finally reach the Cloud 
apps layer running the BI applications. The roles of the 
layers are explained as the following: 
a) Tenants’ firewalls – are deployed for ensuring that 
authorized tenants are allowed to enter the Cloud; 
includes built-in authentication using RADIUS, 
protocol. 
b) Tenants’ Metadata – comprises detailed tenant 
information for ensuring their authorization to 
destination application instances and database 
objects; permissions details are embedded in the 
tenant sessions. 
c) Tenants’ Vaults – comprises decryption keys or 
digital signatures for unlocking the destination 
application instances and database objects. 
d) Intrusion Prevention System – checks for traces of 
exploit signatures in the ongoing sessions. 
e) Anti-malware – checks for viruses and spyware 
signatures in the ongoing sessions. 
f) Tenant Apps – comprises suites of BI applications. 
g) Tenant DB – comprises a large repository of 
database objects serving the BI applications. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Cloud layers modeled  
 
The Cloud layer services are modeled as shown in 
Figure 3. Each database service has a built-in relational 
database for examining the tenant sessions. Tenant metadata 
comprises tenants’ information for enabling authorization to 
designated application instances and database objects that the 
tenant has subscribed. Tenants’ vault comprises keys and 
digital signatures stored in database objects that can be 
retrieved based on tenant authorization enabled by the 
metadata layer. The IPS comprises a database of known 
exploit signatures such that a tenant’s attempt to launch 
exploits through an authorized session can be matched with 
them, detected, and blocked. The anti-malware comprises a 
database of known malware traces such that a tenant’s 
attempt to spread malware through authorized sessions can 
be detected and blocked. The Cloud DB comprises the 
database objects that the tenant is authorized to access. These 
objects are locked and can be unlocked by the keys picked 
up from the tenant vault layer. OPNET does not have the 
feature to enter content in databases. Hence, the simulations 
are limited to studying their operating behavior, performance 
levels, and blocking of attacks. 
The applications are packaged in profiles as shown in 
Figure 3. In this design, the profiles represent a pool of 
virtual machines in which, all the security/privacy services, 
the Cloud BI apps, and the Cloud BI database are packaged. 
There is no profile configured for allowing access to these 
applications services outside the virtual machines. All the 
servers on the Cloud run these virtual machines profiles only. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Virtual Machines with applications packaged 
 
An attack scenario is presented in Figure 4. In this 
scenario, the attacker may gain access to a VM in the 
capacity of a verified tenant. The Cloud service providers 
offer a number of subscriptions and the tenant is given access 
to their virtualized environments after some preliminary 
verification (like ID and address proof, bank account details, 
credit card details, etc.). However, the tenant may be a 
hacker attacking neighboring VMs through virtual links. As 
per the scenario shown in Figure 4, the attacker may deploy 
effective exploitation tools like Metasploit and Netmapper 
on their VMs. Metasploit works in a terminal emulation 
mode. The attacker may simply have to store its files on the 
virtual disks on the Cloud accessible through the VM and 
launch the terminal emulation. It launches an emulation 
screen and allows the attacker to execute thousands of 
exploits from its internal database of exploit codes and their 
payloads. The entire process is quite user-friendly and expert 
attackers can even modify its codes to make it operative in 
any environment. The process is described in detail on 
metasploit.com. It is also used as a penetration-testing tool 
given its stealth capabilities. Metasploit can help the attacker 
to penetrate the neighboring VMs and create covert channels 
through which, data proliferation can be carried out without 
anyone knowing about it. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. An attack scenario showing the problem 
 
When such exploits are launched from the VM owned by 
the attacker, the Cloud security controls will not have any 
ways to know about the attacks. This is because the attacker 
has already entered the maize of VMs hosting hundreds and 
thousands of them. The Cloud providers may be having 
sound peripheral security controls around this maize of VMs 
for protecting against external attackers. However, what 
could be done when an attacker has access to a VM deep 
inside the maize by merely buying a premium subscription? 
There needs to be a solution to such a scenario. The solution 
can be implemented by converting the maize of VMs into a 
hierarchical framework as presented in Figure 5. In the 
modified scenario, the attacker is shown as entered VM2 
through a formal subscribing process of the Cloud service 
provider (perhaps, paying the highest subscription and 
getting a premium user status). The attacker can attack VM1 
and VM3 through cross-channel attacks (VM to VM) 
because the virtual links are insecure. The security controls 
are normally deployed outside the hosts having VMs and 
hence they can protect against external attackers only. In this 
scenario, the attacker has gained access to VM2 and hence is 
an insider attacker. This might have happened through 
subscription validations. 
 
Fig. 5. A hierarchical framework presented as a solution to the attack 
scenario in Figure 4. 
 
However, in this architecture the attacker will not gain 
anything by attacking VMs 1 and 3 because they have 
nothing except a BI client that can proceed only through the 
next control (example, Tenant Metadata inspection). Hence, 
the attacker will have no choice but to proceed through the 
Real network link and establish session with VMs 4 to 6. 
These VMs hold the first control (tenant metadata 
inspection). The attacker may cross this control if he/she has 
genuine tenant credentials. However, the attacker will be 
countered by the second control in VMs 7, 8, 9. In this way, 
the attacker will have to breach all control layers 
successfully before reach the VMs hosting the BI databases. 
In order to breach the databases for stealing data of other 
tenants, the attacker will have to use exploit tools (like, 
Metasploit, NetMapper or Pinger). However, these exploits 
will be detected by the IPS and Anti-malware layers. Hence, 
the attacker may fail to steal any data in spite of gaining 
access to Cloud VMs by buying subscriptions. For example, 
this design can protect Amazon EC2 Cloud that has been 
tested to be vulnerable to VM to VM cross channel attacks. 
Figure 6 presents the mechanism in which the controls 
may be deployed. The sequencing of controls may merely be 
security policy decision for making the system as effective as 
possible. The concept will remain the same irrespective of 
how the controls are organized. Figure 6 shows the path of 
the session of a tenant travelling through multiple VMs 
before reaching the BI application and its databases. 
 
 
Fig.  6. The controls positioned on each layer of the hierarchy 
 
The VM1 comprises a lightweight client of the BI 
application loaded in VM7. The client knows nothing except 
that it needs to connect to VM7 to proceed further. Hence, an 
attacker in an adjacent VM will gain nothing by attacking 
this VM. The attacker will have this client anyways on 
his/her native VM. The client may be viewed as an empty 
window in which, the subsequent controls will launch 
screens for capturing details. At VM2, the client session will 
be tested for the source VM (by virtue of a VM identification 
code) and a screen will be launched for entering 
authentication details. At VM3, the client will launch a 
screen for capturing the tenant details. It may be in a form 
for randomly asked questions and answers. For example, the 
form may ask to enter mobile number, social security code, 
and zip code to proceed further. The questions may vary in 
each new session. The tenant cannot move further without 
answering the questions. The VM2 will check the answers in 
MetaDB and allow the session to proceed. At this stage, the 
tenant cannot forge answers unless an exploit is used to 
penetrate the MetaDB and steal information about other 
tenants. The MetaDB is expected to be secured and patched 
with latest updates. However, if the attacker is successful the 
session can proceed to the next level. It may be noted that the 
exploit traces have entered the session packets and hence 
attacker will have no means to clean them before proceeding. 
This is because the attacker cannot interrupt the session and 
inspect the packets of the ongoing session. A session 
interrupter needs to be placed between the VMs 4 and 5, 
which is not there by design. These VMs security controls 
accessible only to the security administration team of the 
Cloud service provider. Hence, assuming that the attacker is 
able to breach VM4 to steal digital signatures or private 
keys, as well, the traces of exploit will be detected at VMs 5 
and 6. Both the layers are equipped with databases of all 
known exploit and malware signatures. Hence, the sessions 
cannot escape them. The only scenario of their success can 
be the zero day attack when a new form of exploit or 
malware has been used to penetrate the VMs 3 and 4 and the 
databases of VMs 5 and 6 are not updated with their 
information. Now-a-days, security vendors are working 
actively to counter zero day attacks through their IPS or 
other form of solutions. A study of websites of security 
companies like Symantec, Cisco, Trend Micro, etc. will 
reveal about their research and new innovations. These 
companies are actively designing their solutions for 
virtualization platforms. This architecture is not about the 
capabilities of IPS and antimalware controls albeit is about 
how these controls can be deployed in a multi-layer 
hierarchy. In fact, any form of new controls can be added to 
this solution by simply adding a Cloud layer. Once the 
session screen passes all the controls, it reaches the BI App 
VM where the screen for launching reports and dashboards 
will be displayed. Given that all these layers will have 
multiple VMs with parallel computing, the inspections can 
be completed within a few seconds thus ensuring acceptable 
performance. However, it needs to be considered that the 
multi-level inspections of session packets will induce delays. 
While the VMs 2, 3, and 4 will not inspect the packets of an 
allowed session, the IPS and antimalware in VMs 5 and 6 
will continue to inspect each packet passing through them. 
All these controls will be software-based controls with 
active databases supporting them. They are expected to act at 
the platform-as-a-service layer except the firewall, which is 
expected to act at the infrastructure-as-a-service layer. The 
mapping of these controls with the seven-layer Cloud model 
presented by references [14] and [15] is presented in Figure 
7. The Figure 7 shows that the layers 1, 2, and 3 will 
comprise tenant VMs with BI clients and no data stored. The 
sessions from tenant VMs will go through multiple 
validations in layers 4 and 5 before reaching layer 6 for 
accessing the SaaS BI application or layer 7 for accessing 
tenants’ customized applications and databases. In this way, 
the proposed architecture is positioned on layer 4 (IaaS) and 
layer 5 (PaaS). The firewall is treated as an IaaS control 
because it will authorize sessions by inspecting VM IDs and 
hence has a link with the virtualization and composition 
layers. The VM IDs will be assigned automatically at layers 
2 and 3 and the access controls for them will be assigned at 
the layer 4 in the firewall. The remaining controls are not 
concerned with the VM identification because they are 
deployed for packet inspections. Hence, they may be 
perceived as platform controls. There may be application-
level controls as well, which are not shown in this 
architecture. For example, the BI apps may have own 
authentication layer. In addition, the tenants may have an 
additional layer of authentication layer established for 
accessing data based on their organizational roles. For 
example, the CEOs may have different access levels than the 
employees. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Mapping of the proposed architecture with the   
seven-layer Cloud model 
 
The proposed solution is presented in the form of the 
following algorithm. The algorithm can be modified if the 
security policy of sequencing the controls is changed. 
However, the basic structure of the algorithm will remain the 
same.  
 
 
S = tenant session 
Pct = contents of session packets; 
DBfw = contents of FW 
DBmeta = contents of TENANT_META; 
DBvault = contents of TENANT_VAULT; 
DBips = contents of IPS; 
DBantimal = contents of ANTIMALWARE; 
 
S = 1  If Pct Є {DBfw, DBmeta, DBvault} AND Pct {DBips, 
DBantimal);  
= 0  Otherwise; 
Here, 1 = permit, and 0 = deny. 
{ 
Step 1: Initiate S; 
Step 2: Do steps 3-19; 
Step 3: Set S = 1, Match Pct ; 
Step 4: If Pct ≠ DBfw; S = 0, Go to Step 5 
Else, go to Step 6 
Step 5: End IF; 
Step 6: Set S = 1, Match Pct 
Step 7: If Pct ≠ DBmeta; S = 0, Go to Step 8 
Else, go to Step 9 
Step 8: End IF; 
Step 9: Set S = 1, Match Pct 
Step 10: If Pct ≠ DBvault; S = 0; Go to Step 11 
Else, go to Step 12 
Step 11: End IF; 
Step 12: Set S = 1, Match Pct 
Step 13: If Pct = DBips; S = 0; Go to Step 14 
Else, go to Step 15 
Step 14: End IF; 
Step 15: Set S = 1, Match Pct 
Step 16: If Pct = DBantimal; S = 0; Go to Step 17 
Else, go to Step 18 
Step 17: End IF; 
Step 18: Set S = 1; 
Step 19: Loop 
} 
 
The contents of the session packets (Pct) are matched 
with the contents of the databases positioned at each 
checkpoint (DBfw, DBmeta, DBvault, DBips, and DBantimal). The 
session is initiated by the client machine (through a browser 
based VM) at Step 1. The first level of inspection is at Step 
3. The session should contain VM ID provided by the Cloud 
service provider. There should be an entry of the VM ID in 
the firewall database (DBfw), else the session will be 
dropped. The next checkpoint is at step 6. The session should 
comprise authentication-related information (like, userID 
token, password token, unique client ID, and such other 
identifiers assigned by the Cloud administrators). The 
authentication information contained in the session packets 
should match the registries in the tenant metadata (DBmeta). 
The session is allowed only if the information contained in 
the session packets match the registry entries. The next 
checkpoint is at Step 9 for verifying if the session with its 
unique VM ID and authentication ID has been allocated a 
private key to access encrypted database rows. The session 
will be dropped if there are no decryption keys assigned to 
the designated unique VM ID or unique tenant ID. If the 
session passes this level, it is a fully authenticated and 
authorized session. However, in this design the packet 
inspectors for Exploits, Trojan codes, and malware are 
positioned after full authentication and authorization. This 
has been done to protect the Cloud from insider attackers. 
The inspections and matching with intrusion prevention 
database (DBips), and antimalware database (DBantimal) can 
block attacks by authorized VMs, as well. The steps 12 and 
15 are designed for this purpose.  
A closer look at the algorithm reveals that the tenant session 
initiates in the first hop and scrutinized at each layer. All 
layers are deployed as separate Clouds. The fundamental 
rule states that in order to permit the session until the Cloud 
apps, the packet contents of the tenant session should match 
the contents of firewalls, tenant metadata, and tenant vault, 
and should not match the contents of IPS and antimalware 
databases. Hence, the algorithm can prevent insider 
attackers, and can enhance multi-tenancy security in the 
Cloud IaaS, and Cloud PaaS models as well.  
Table 1 presents the profile and destination preferences 
of Tenants’ LAN 1. This LAN has 500 client machines and 
three VMs are allocated for each client named – VM1, VM2, 
and VM3. It may be noted that the destination settings on 
this LAN is the Tenants’ Metadata servers, and not the main 
BI applications and databases. This has been configured to 
ensure that the tenant sessions do not bypass the first 
security/privacy layer of the Cloud. In real networks, this 
control can be implemented either in the applications 
manager of the virtual network controller or in an application 
layer firewall. Similar settings have been made in the 
destination preferences of Tenants’ metadata servers that 
point towards the tenant vaults. These configurations justify 
how the algorithm is supposed to work. They enforce 
sequential checks of each session packet not allowing them 
to jump any checkpoint. 
 
Table 1 Tenants’ LAN attributes 
 
 
The Cloud is multi-layered and the destination 
preferences of one layer are to the subsequent layer only. 
Hence, a session cannot be established directly with the 
Cloud apps servers by passing these layers. The content 
session packets are compared with the database contents of 
each layer. Based on the fundamental rule, the session either 
is permitted to the next layer or is denied. For example, if 
the session contents do not comprise a tenant key identical 
to the one stored in the vault, it is not assigned an 
encryption key, and the packets are dropped, based on a rule 
recommended by [19]. The hackers have been configured as 
clients having access though the first layer of firewalls 
because they are the valid tenants (by purchasing an initial 
subscription on the Cloud). The results of the simulation are 
presented and discussed in the next section. 
 
V. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the sessions encountered by the tenant 
LAN. It may be observed that all the sessions initiated from 
the tenant LAN are with tenant Metadata only through all the 
virtual machines. Similarly, the sessions are between tenant 
Metadata and tenant Vault only for the same virtual 
machines. This has been observed for all the hops designed 
in the model. The results indicate that the virtual machines 
cannot jump a layer given their pre-defined destination 
preferences. In this way, the session inspections and 
forwarding/dropping are mandatorily implied on each VM. 
 
Table 2. Client DB sessions on Tenants’ LAN 
 
 
 
 
The VMs assigned to the hackers are kept out of the 
tenant Metadata and the tenant Vault application profiles. In 
practice, this scenario may be viewed as the unauthorized 
users not having any records in the metadata or the vault 
when trying to access a different domain than allowed to 
them. It may be observed in Figure 8 that the IP packets 
from the hackers’ LAN dropped after an initial attempt. To 
get through all the layers and establish unauthorized 
sessions with the Cloud apps, the hackers will need to break 
the metadata layer, the vaults layer, the IPS layer, and the 
antimalware layer. It is unlikely that the hackers will be able 
to break so many security/privacy layers to reach the Cloud 
apps. 
 
 
Fig. 8. After initial attempts, IP packets from the hackers’ machines are 
dropped 
 
On the other hand, the authorized tenants’ LANs could 
run DB sessions throughout the simulation period as shown 
in Figure 11. This is because their VMs are added to the 
application profiles of all the layers (i.e., their sessions 
fulfill the rule shown in the algorithm). This is a multi-layer 
security architecture in which, each layer can be a Cloud in 
itself and served by a different Cloud service provider. 
Hence, this entire architecture is termed as a multi-layer 
security as a service framework for tenant organizations 
hosting BI applications and databases on outsourced private 
and community Clouds. These services may be premium 
and expensive and hence, may not be suitable for public 
Clouds. In addition, there are challenges of maintaining five 
inspection-aiding databases for keeping them highly 
performing and up-to-date. There may be costs charged to 
tenants for records maintenance in tenants’ firewalls, 
tenants’ metadata registries, and tenants’ vaults. All access 
permissions may be based on the Unique VM IDs of the 
browser-based VM access allocated to the client. The IPS 
and antimalware databases can be updated regularly through 
their websites of original software manufacturers (OSMs). 
Given the volumes expected in these Clouds, such updating 
will require inter-Cloud communications such that all 
databases in the IPS and Antimalware arrays can pull 
records from OSMs databases directly. All the five 
databases should be hosted on server arrays with parallel 
processing, as configured in the model. The number of 
servers per array will be in hundreds and not the few shown 
in the model. Hence, this model is designed to establish the 
concept only and not demonstrate the expected volumes. 
 Fig. 9. Authorized tenant LANs established and ran DB sessions with the 
TENANT METADATA  
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, a multi-layer model of security and privacy 
on Cloud computing is proposed for securing BI and its data 
warehouses/data marts on Cloud computing. The design is 
based on a multi-step algorithm comprising inspection of 
session packets at each layer of the design. The contents of 
the session packets should match the firewall, tenant 
metadata, and tenant vault layers and should not match the 
IPS and antimalware layers. The layers are configured in 
such a manner that the devices of one layer prefer the next 
layer for its sessions. Given that all sessions are running in 
the VMs, they need to be scrutinized at all these layers 
before allowed to the final Cloud apps layer. The hackers 
could not breach the layers because their VMs were included 
in the profiles of the firewall layer only. This scenario is 
similar to a tenant having metadata and vault access 
attributes assigned by the Cloud service provider, which are 
unknown to the hacker. Hence, penetrating the firewalls’ 
layer could not serve the purpose of the hackers. However, 
maintaining this system will require costly services thus 
making it unsuitable for public Clouds. The solution is 
mapped with 7-layer Cloud model. 
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